The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 14
Issue 2 June - Special Issue on Social Welfare
History

Article 5

May 1987

The Failure of the Destitute Mother's Bill: The Use of Political
Power in Social Welfare
Eve P. Smith
Western Illinois University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the American Politics Commons, Social Welfare Commons, and the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
Smith, Eve P. (1987) "The Failure of the Destitute Mother's Bill: The Use of Political Power in Social
Welfare," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 14 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol14/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

THE FAILURE OF THE
DESTITUTE MOTHER'S BILL:
THE USE OF POLITICAL POWER
IN SOCIAL WELFARE
Eve P. Smith
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Western Illinois University
Macomb, IL

Although social and economic conditions and prevailing popular
philosophies may affect the success or failure of an attempt at
change in social welfare policy and practice, the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the political forces for and against the change
may be more important. In 1897, fourteen years before the passage
of the first U.S. Mothers' Pension law in Illinois, New York State
Senator John Ahearn attempted such a law in New York. Although
the bill was passed unanimously by both houses of the State Legislature, it was never signed into law. The reason was that the children's institutions and other philanthropic organizations formed a
coalition and effectively organized against the proposed bill, while
supporters of the bill were not organized. Although it failed, this
attempt contributed to the future passage of Mothers' Pensions law
by helping to bring the issue to public attention, and stimulating
the creation of other programs that would address the problem.
At approximately thirty year intervals, attempts are
made to significantly change the policies and practices of the
social welfare institutions in the United States. In 1935, for
example, the Social Security Act became federal law. In the
1960's, attempts were made, at various levels of government,

to liberalize the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program. Currently, major changes, such as the
addition of work requirements for mothers of young children, are also being considered. While reforms of the 1960's
were often met with strenuous resistance, current proposals
appear to be gathering general support.
Why are some proposed changes implemented, while
others are not? The answer lies, in part, in social and economic conditions, and prevailing philosophies of the times.
Still more influential, however, may be the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the political forces for and against the
changes, with whom those forces are allied, and how well
they are organized.
Such failures to initiate reforms, however, may also be
precursors of successful attempts. Outcomes may be (1) that
the issues are brought to public attention for later action; (2)
that more effective efforts may then be organized; and (3)
that alternate programs addressing the problems may be developed.
This paper examines one historical instance of successful
resistance to reform; the failure of an attempt to change public policy regarding dependent children and their families in
New York City at the turn of the century. It also examines
the contribution of that effort to eventual success.
THE STORY OF THE DESTITUTE MOTHERS' BILL

On March 30, 1897,1 State Senator John Francis Ahearn
of New York City introduced a reform bill in the New York
State Legislature. His bill would have provided funds for
some destitute New York City parents and would have
enabled them to care for their own children instead of being
forced to place them in institutions. The act, which was
called the "Destitute Mothers' Bill", read as follows:
"When any child shall hereafter be committed to the care
of any institution in the city of New York, the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children in said city, shall, upon the

application of the parent or guardian of such child, in a proper
case, after a careful and thorough inquiry, direct that the custody of such child be given to its parent or guardian, and in
such event the comptroller of said city of New York is
authorized to pay said society, for transmission by it to such a
parent or guardian, the money allowed by law for the maintenance, care and welfare of such child and paid by said city to
the institution to which it may have been committed.
"The said society may revoke any such change of custody
and return such child to the institution to which it was originally committed, whenever in its judgment the interests of
said child will be benefited thereby . . ."
The New York City charitable organizations were in
complete and unanimous disagreement with this reform
proposal. But initially, they took no action, since they had
been assured that the bill would be killed. Nine days after it
was introduced, however, the "Destitute Mothers' Bill"
unanimously passed the Senate, and the day after, the Assembly. Neither body had held hearings. Since this proposed law would apply exclusively to New York City, 2 however, the Mayor was required to hold a public hearing. This
was scheduled for April 21st. In preparation, the State
Charities Aid Association circulated an alert to all New York
City Charitable organizations. The alert was successful. At
the hearing, which lasted less than one hour, there were
only two speakers for the bill, and more than twelve against.
Among the twelve against were representatives of both private and governmental agencies: William R. Stewart,
President of the State Board of Charities; John P. Fauvre,
Commissioner of the New York City Department of Public
Charities; John B. Pine, representative of the State Charities
Aid Association; representatives of agencies that maintained
children's institutions and agencies that worked with poor
families; and Elbridge T. Gerry, President of the Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the agency that would
be charged with dispensing payments and supervising the
destitute families should the Ahearn bill become law.

The agencies' arguments attacked all key provisions of
the proposed bill. If it were passed, they said, a system of
public outdoor relief would be reestablished in the City, and
this, they claimed, would "promote pauperism, discourage
self-reliance and thrift, and . . . (would be) liable to flagrant
abuses" (Twenty-fifth Annual Report . . ., 1897, pp. 81-82).
In addition, it was argued that the sum was set without relation to the need of the parties to be aided; administration of
the law was to be placed in the hands of a private corporation with no responsibility to the taxpayers; parents receiving two dollars per week per child would not have enough
money because they would not be supplemented with additional private funds as were the institutions; and above all,
it was objected that the bill would encourage "shiftless
fathers" to desert their families since the later could then be
supported by public monies. Based on this assumption, it
was argued that the number of children to be supported as
public charges would grow. The City was then spending almost $2,000,000 per year for the care of dependent children:
if the bill were passed, many additional families would
surely apply for public money because they would no longer
have to suffer the pain of separation in order to feed their
children.
The only speakers in favor of the bill were Bernard
Downing, who represented Senator Ahearn, and Mrs. Silas
P. Severidge, who said that she devoted a great deal of her
time to visiting the poor, but was not connected with any
particular organization. Mr. Downing focused his testimony
on the harm to children that results from institutionalization.
As reported by Homer Folks in the July-August issue of the
Charities Review, Downing said that he ". . . wished that a
Dickens might be present to portray these benevolent managers, who insisted that the only proper way to assist a poor
mother was to take her children away from her and support
them in their institutions" (Folks 1897, p. 497). Folks reported that Mrs. Severidge "assured the Mayor that, if he
could appreciate the distress and suffering of parents who
had been compelled to give up their children, he would not

withhold his signature from the bill" 3 (Folks, 1897, p. 497).
The Mayor had fifteen days from the time he received
the bill to return it to the Legislature with his comments.
His disapproval reached them on the last possible day. Unfortunately for the proponents of the bill, this was the last
day of the legislative session, and it was too late for the
legislature to re-vote it over the Mayor's disapproval. It was
never signed by the Governor.
In 1898, on the first day of the next legislative session,
the Destitute Mothers' Bill was again introduced by Senator
Ahearn. This time the charity organizations were ready: they
called for and got hearings before the Senate Committee on
the Affairs of Cities. 4 The bill was bottled up in this committee and never reached the floor for a vote, nor did it the following year, even when it was introduced in modified form
to meet the objections of the charity organizations.
The Sixteenth Annual Report of the Charity Organization Society of New York describes that hearing. 5 It was
argued that:
"... this plan is a scarcely disguised form of outdoor relief, that there are serious objections to any plan by which the
State undertakes to pay parents for the care of their own children, and that 'shiftless fathers' would be quite as apt as 'destitute mothers' to claim the indulgence of the Society and the
public. All these and other weighty, if less obvious arguments
were urged in a variety of telling addresses before the Senate
Committee by a strong representative delegation from the
charitable societies and institutions of New York City, and the
committee, accepting the views thus presented, allowed the
1898,
bill to remain unreported (Sixteenth Annual Report ....
10-11).
pp.
The bill failed despite the fact that there had begun to be
public distrust of children's institutions. Abraham Epstein,
describing public opinion in the 1890's observed that there
was a
... realization that huge asylums were bad for children,
mothers and society . . . Institutional life dulled and blighted
the inmates. Institutional children were frequently slower to

develop, and altogether too many were unable to cope with
life outside of the institution. Even a second-rate mother was
recognized as better than the very best institution, while a
good mother could do for her own children what no other
woman or organization could do .

.

. Some low-grade institu-

tions also showed exceedingly high death rates which shocked
the nation" (Epstein, 1933, p. 623).
From 1894 through 1898, the New York Times carried
numerous stories about institutions' mistreatment and illegal
transport of children West, and also related instances in
which institutions refused to cooperate with the Commissioner of Accounts when he tried to investigate alleged City
overpayments for the care of children who were public
charges. On June 5th of 1895, for example, an article appeared under the headline, "Deborah Nursery: Superintendent B. Abrams charged with cruelty" 6 from March, 1894
through October, 1897, nineteen stories appeared about allegations of cruelty and corporal punishment of inmates by
the Superintendent of the Westchester Temporary Home for
Destitute Children, J.W. Pierce. 7 In June 1897, stories appeared relating that "New York Foundling Asylum Agent R.
Curran sells children in Chicago" 8; on April 1, 1897, there
was a report that "John Neese (was) sent West by Gerry
Society Without Guardian's Permission" 9 . In November,
1894, a story appeared relating that "Charitable institutions
(are) paid for more County Wards than Legal .. ."10; in
August, 1896, there was a report of investigations by the
Commissioner of Accounts over overpayments by the City
Controller to the Infant Asylum1 1 ; and in May, 1898, there
were several articles about another investigation by the
Commissioner of Accounts: this time, of the Immaculate
12
Virgin Mission on Staten Island
Not only the New York Times, but other periodicals published articles opposing the use of institutions for the care of
dependent children. An example of such an article appeared
in the North American Review of April, 1897. It depicted the
"evil results of institutional life and training." Its author,
Henry Smith Williams, cited the fact that New York City
was then caring for 16,000 children in twenty-five institu-

tions, one in thirty-five, at a cost of about four million dollars annually. He believed such care was inappropriate and
expensive:
"... About 70,000 children in the U.S. are being reared in
this abnormal way, and the taxpayers and benevolent individuals are together paying over $10,000,000 a year . . . How
much it cost them later on to complete the task in the police
courts, almshouses, work houses and prisons, it would be impossible to correctly estimate" (Williams, 1897, pp. 404-414).
Nor was the press alone. Judges, who in some places
had the responsibility for committing children to be cared
for at State expense, often became spokesmen against institutional child-rearing. Senator Ahearn, who had spent five
years as a clerk of one of the New York City police courts,
witnessed countless cases of children removed from their
families and sent to institutions solely because their parents
were unable to provide for them financially.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "NEW

YORK

SYSTEM"

FOR THE

CARE OF DESTITUTE CHILDREN

To understand why the care of dependent children had
become a serious public concern in New York City, it is
necessary to consider how children's institutions evolved
there.
While social welfare services were developing largely as
government-run entities in most parts of the United States,
New York City had instead developed a system of publicly
funded private agencies, largely controlled by their philanthropic boards.
As early as 1811, the New York State Legislature provided funds for the institutional care of dependent children
by private agencies. By the middle of the century, large-scale
immigration, uncontrolled industrialization and sharp business swings were responsible for the development of a
growing class of urban poor. The number of children whose
parents were unable to care for them multiplied. Immigration brought social disorganization: parents who had difficulty coping in a new land with a new language, culture and

societal values had the added difficulty of coping with unemployment, low pay, and the demands of working long
hours in order to eat. Some were unable to provide needed
food, clothing and shelter. Many were unable to exercise the
necessary parental guidance and control that would insure
that the children would grow up with the ability to function
appropriately. Some children became vagrants.
Brace's solution was the "placing out" of children with
families in the country. From 1853 through 1890, the Children's Aid Society moved more than 85,000 children from
New York City to farm families in upstate New York, New
Jersey, and as far away as Minnesota, Kansas and Texas. 13
Not all of these children were abandoned vagrants or orphans, however. Many were brought to the Society by parents who were too poor to provide food and other necessities. Giving them up was the only way to keep the children alive. He placed children without regard to religion.
While many of the new immigrants were Roman Catholics,
and later, Jews, most of the farmers who received the children were Protestants.
In reaction, Catholics and Jews created large congregate
institutions for the care of their co-religionists' children.
However, although these were established under voluntary
and sectarian auspices, they were in large part funded by
the City and State of New York. The Hebrew Benevolent
Society and Orphan Asylum in the City of New York, for
example, received a parcel of land on 77th Street and Third
Avenue, donated by the City for the purpose of erecting a
building to house 200 orphans. The City also contributed
$30,000 toward building costs, and the State Assembly
agreed to contribute another $35,000. The Society had only
to raise $20,000. By 1874, the Society was receiving about 70
percent of its operating budget, or $23,203.97, from public
funds (Bernard, 1973, p. 10 and 14).
The very next year, the legislature adopted an act that
would stimulate even greater growth in the use of institutions to house children. The Children's Law of 187514 required that children between the ages of three and sixteen

be removed from poorhouses ("unless such child be an unteachable idiot, an epileptic or paralytic, or be defective,
diseased or deformed . . .") and were to be placed in a children's institution or home governed by persons of the same
religion as their parents (Schneider and Deutch, 1938-1941
p. 63).
The result was a rapid growth in specialized children's
institutions. In 1875, the year of enactment, there were only
9,363 institutionalized New York City children who were
public charges. By 1888, the number had increased by 68
percent, to 15,697. During this period, the amount of public
monies spent for the care of those children rose by 115 percent (N.Y. State Board of Charities, 1980, p. 181). By 1898,
the number of children in care away from their families had
risen to 18,000. The time that each child remained in care
also lengthened during this period. In 1875, only 8 percent
of all institutionalized children stayed more than five years:
by 1894, 23 percent were long-term residents (Bernard, 1973,
p. 34).
Public response to this change led to attempts at systemic change that would limit the number of children in
care. The Revised Constitution of 1894 gave more power to
the state supervising body, the State Board of Charities. This
body then issued tightened eligibility requirements and required public agency approval before children could be
placed in private institutions as public charges. The New
York City Department of Public Charities employed a staff of
examiners to investigate the circumstances of families before
the children were placed, and at yearly intervals thereafter.
The new measures were effective as long as they were
enforced. While there had been an increase of 15.8 percent
in the number of institutionalized children from 1890 to
1894, there was a decrease from 1894 to 1896 of 8.6 percent
(State Charities Aid Association of New York, 1898, p. 6).
The fact that New York was in the throes of an acute economic depression through 1895 makes this decrease even
more significant. The number rose again in 1897, however.
The Annual Report of the State Charities Aid Association of

November 1, 1898, stated that " . . the New Constitution
(was) remarkably successful and effective for about three
years, appears to have lost something of its restraining
force" (State Charities Aid Association of New York, 1898, p.
10). As the cost to the public again grew, so did public concern.
THE OPPOSITION OF THE "PHILANTHROPIC COMMUNITY"
TO MOTHERS' PENSIONS

Even though there was a developing consensus against
institutions, the defenders of the institutions profited from
the fact that, in 1897, social welfare leaders still regarded a
destitute mothers' subsidy as an alternative even worse than
institutionalization. To them, the primary objection was that
Senator Ahearn's proposed reform would route public
money to poor parents.
The bill was opposed not only by representatives of
childcaring institutions who stood to lose public funding if
the law passed: it was also opposed by officials of the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and by
other social work organizations 1 5 who, even though they
were against institutionalization of children, could not support a reform that would make benefit payments to poor
parents.
Notable social workers who spoke out against mothers'
pensions were Mary Richmond, Edward T. Devine, and
Josephine Lowell, founder of the New York Charity Organization Society and member of the New York State Board of
Charities from 1876 to 1889. Lowell was against mothers'
pensions even though she believed that institutions were
bad for children, and had previously stated that ". . . it
ought to be considered cruel and wicked to take children
away from a decent mother just for want of money to support them and friends to look after them. . . ." Her fear of
the encouragement of "pauperism", however, appeared to
have been stronger than her belief that poor children should
not be removed from their mothers.
The agency that took the lead in organizing the opposi-

tion to what some social workers called Ahearn's "Shiftless
Fathers' Bill" was the State Charities Aid Association, an
organization whose general secretary, Homer Folks, was actually an active proponent of keeping children out of institutions.
Why, then, was there such adamant opposition to subsidizing poor parents so as to prevent institutionalization?
According to I.M. Rubinow, who wrote in 1934, one explanation of the resistance of social work to "mothers' pensions" is that it resulted from the identification of social
work of the late 19th century with private philanthropy
(Rubinow, 1934, p. 487). The Boards of both children's institutions and charity organizations were largely composed
of philanthropists who were closely related to the industrial
elite.
Most philanthropists were adamantly opposed to any
form of outdoor relief. During one forum on mothers' pensions, for example, philanthropist, Otto T. Bannard, argued
that ". . . widows' pensions would eventually lead to such
horrors as old-age pensions, free food for the unemployed,
will breed candidates for alms, will repress self-help and
self-respect, is not American, and is the entering wedge of
state socialism (Rubinow, 1934, pp. 487-488).
Statements such as this were not simply a matter of rich
versus poor, however. To fully understand why mothers'
pensions in general, and Senator Ahearn's proposal in particular were so heartily condemned, it is necessary to understand the role social welfare organizations played in relation
to the political and philosophical debates of the era. One
must also understand the degree to which local social work
was shaped by the corrupt politics of New York City in the
late 19th century.
THE "ESTABLISHMENT'S"

VIEW OF THE POOR

Social workers, philanthropists and New York State officials of the latter half of the Nineteenth Century tended to
believe that the poor were responsible for their poverty. According to the New York State Senate's Report of the Select

Committee Appointed to Visit Charitable Institutions Supported
by the State in 1857, ". . . the kind of poverty which ends in
a poor house ... is not unusually the result of such selfindulgence, unthrift, excess, or idleness, as is next of kind to
criminality" (New York State Senate, 1857, pp. 9-10).
"Pauperism", as opposed to poverty, was of particular
concern to many nineteenth century Americans: its discussion constituted a major topic of the first meeting of the National Conference of Boards of Public Charities, in May 1874.
According to Frank J. Bruno, primary concern was for "the
weakness of the victims of destitution . . . for treatment, and
even for cure, and not much attention was paid to those
situations, external to the dependent, which might throw
some light upon the reasons for their dependence" (Bruno,
1957, p. 27).
According to the common wisdom of the rich of the era,
the poor, who chose their lot, were unwilling to work hard,
preferring a life of vice, ignorance and crime. They had
comparatively little self-control: Brace wrote that ". . . the
high lessons of duty and consideration for others are seldom
stamped on them, and Religion does not much influence
their more delicate relations with those associated with
them" (Brace, 1872, p. 40). F.A. Walker, in the December
1897 issue of Century Magazine, wrote:
"Pauperism is, in truth, largely voluntary to the full degree
in which anything can be said to be voluntary in a world of
causation, a matter, if not of definite and conscious choice,
then of appetites and aptitudes indulged or submitted to from
inherent baseness or cowardice or moral weakness. Those who
are paupers are so far more from character than from condition. They have the pauper taint; they bear the pauper brand
(Walker, 1897, p. 210; Howard, 1897).
Even Amos Warner, a social welfare leader who
pioneered in the consideration of social causes of poverty, in
his first edition of American Charities, published in 1894,
"treated poverty no matter what the cause, as synonymous
with 'degeneration' " (Bremner, 1956, p. 71).
One prevailing philosophy of the day was "Social Dar-

winism." Darwin's study of evolution was interpreted by
Herbert Spencer, an English civil engineer turned sociologist, to mean that those who were unable to ma;ntain
themselves in society should not be aided by those more
able, but should be allowed to die lest they reproduce more
of their own kind and thus weaken society. According to
Spencer, "The unfit must be eliminated as nature intended,
for the principle of natural selection must not be violated by
the artificial preservation of those least able to take care of
themselves (Bremner, 1956, p. 71).
The principles of Social Darwinism were not fully accepted in the United States, but were modified by a strong
tradition which still saw a value in charitable impulses
stimulated by the presence of poor people. According to
Tratner, "even Herbert Spencer, when accused of hardness
of heart because of his attitude toward the poor ... retreated to the position that voluntary charity could be
tolerated in that it encouraged the development of altruism,
a Christian Virtue" (Bremner, 1956, p. 82).
Those who were concerned with the care of dependent
children in the United States were often influenced by a Social Darwinist philosophy. They believed, however, that
even though poor adults were not redeemable, their children
could be taught and would be positively affected by positive
environments. Brace believed that since so many of the poor
died before adulthood, the survivors might be genetically
superior to their parents. He therefore argued that if poor
children were removed from the poor environment of their
parental homes and placed in positive environments on
farms and in country villages, their inherent virtues would
triumph and they would become productive and wellbehaved citizens (Brace, 1872, pp. 45-46). In accordance with
such philosophies, it was considered more appropriate for
dependent children of the later half of the nineteenth century to be cared for apart from their poor parents, who
therefore, would not need financial support.
The giving of alms or other "outdoor relief" was supposed to have encouraged "pauperism" and economic de-

pendency, "a pernicious social disease." Therefore, the givers of philanthropy in the 1890's "operated on the theory
that people ought to be self-supporting and that those who
were not must be led or driven into taking care of themselves" (Bremner, 1956, p. 124).
Many believed that the English were correct in their administration of poor relief, where new Poor Law provisions,
passed as early as 1834, eliminated outdoor relief, entirely.
Mr. Peabody, in his article, "How Should a City Care for its
Poor", published in December, 1892, said that, "We, like the
English, distrust out-door relief; we apply the "poor-house
test". If a person is not willing to go to a city institution, we
argue, he is probably not poor enough to need city help . . .
we defend the community from the pauper" (Peabody, 1892,
pp. 474-491). Only those who were thoroughly investigated
by a private agency and were deemed "worthy" should be
given limited help; preferably in the form of work.
Although industrial expansion brought growing wealth
for the nation, it also brought periodic depressions where
countless laborers were thrown out of work. At best, workers had to accept inadequate wages, according to what the
market would bear, and poor housing conditions. Until the
end of the century, these conditions tended to be largely ignored, however. While poverty was regarded as an indicator
of criminality and inferiority, money, and those who acquired it, by whatever means, became the nation's heroes.
Those who were unable to maintain themselves were considered genetically and morally unfit (Trattner, 1974, p. 81).
Even as the philanthropists and their social work agency
representatives embraced an "anti-poor" philosophy, there
are indicators of a more sympathetic public attitude (Gladden, 1892; and Abbott, 1894). The closing of the frontier,
and the obvious dearth of jobs during economic depressions
made the poor seem less like criminals and more like victims
(Bremner, 1956, p. 30). In many areas of the country, especially during and after the Civil War, the practice of providing public outdoor relief to those in need, continued.
In New York and in some other large cities, however,

where there were many more philanthropists and social
workers, the tendency was to provide "outdoor relief"
through private agencies only, and "indoor" or almshouse
relief through government. Not only did this policy follow
logically from the ideology of the "establishment", it could
also be defended as a way of preventing public graft and
bribery.
PHILANTHROPISTS'
I

OPPOSITION TO TAMMANY

Corruption in government was rampant in big cities.
During the reign of "Boss Tweed" in New York, the public
treasury was systematically raided. An investigation of the
Department of Public Charities in 1874 showed serious discrepancies, and led to a sharp reduction in the Department's
budget (Schneider . . ., p. 35). Social workers and others
complained that public relief went to aid not those who
were worthy and in need, but was primarily used to buy
votes, and to reward the politicians' friends.
In reality, the "Tammany Hall" politicians and their
public welfare system were in competition with private relief
agencies. Many poor persons found application to private
agencies demeaning and embarrassing, and preferred instead to seek financial assistance from politicians who asked
in return their votes rather than their self-respect.
The anti-corruption forces, which included the social
welfare community and many of their rich and powerful
board members, worked to put their own "reform" candidates into office. When these "good government" forces
gained power, Tammany's "alternative" welfare system was
destroyed with the cessation of public outdoor relief in New
York City. In the midst of a prolonged economic depression
that lasted from 1873 to 1878, the Board of Estimate voted
(during February 1875) to limit public relief to cash grants to
the adult blind, and to the distribution of a half-ton of coal
each to needy families during the winter. In December 1876,
in the midst of the coal distribution, they voted to discontinue all public outdoor relief except to blind persons.
Private charity was supposed to take up the slack. How-

ever, in reality, as the number of unemployed persons increased, that became an impossibility. During the suspension of public relief in the last half of 1874, for example, the
caseload of the Association for Improving the Conditions of
the Poor increased by 355 percent. In 1873 the organization
aided 5,292 persons; in 1874, 24,091. Naturally, each family
got less, since the dollars expended less than doubled.
It became evident that private funds were insufficient;
public funds were needed. In 1876 and 1877 the Board of Estimate voted money to private agencies for direct aid: on
January 20, 1876, the sum of $35,200 was granted to six private agencies to be expended "during the present winter for
food, clothing and shelter for the poor (Schneider, 1938-1941,
p. 35). Public money was again being used. This time, however, there was less of it, and control was in the hands of
the rich philanthropists and their agents rather than politicians whom they did not control.
By the time of the depression of 1893 to 1895, both city
and private organizations had developed work relief programs. While these were inadequate to the number of persons unemployed, they were consistent with the belief that
the giving of alms encouraged pauperism. The Twentieth
Annual Report of the Charity Organization Society of the
City of New York contains a clear statement of that philosophy. It read:
"The ideas upon which organized charity rest are that
pauperism-the degrading dependence of one person or family upon others for the necessities of life-should not be
encouraged or acquiesced in, but, on the contrary, that it
should be energetically and hopefully combated; that the
transofrmation of those who are by nature or by misfortune
dependents upon charity into self-supporting and selfrespecting members of the community requires patience, skill
and devotion; that a judicious combination of volunteer and
professional service is most likely to produce the desired result; and that when temporary or even permanent financial assistance is necessary, as it often is, such assistance should not
be given mechanically or carelessly-in other words, as alms,
or doles-but on full and accurate knowledge, on a definite
plan, and with personal interest in the individual who is

helped, as a human being" (The Charity Organization Society
of the City of New York, 1902, p. 13).
PRIVATE CHARITY'S ALTERNATIVES TO MOTHERS'
PENSIONS

Senator Ahearn's attempt was part of a growing dissatisfaction with one way of caring for dependent children, and a
move toward another. Although its failure meant that many
children who could live with their families would continue
to be cared for in institutions for some years, it also stimulated further action and development of alternative programs. The organizations that fought the bill, even though
they were against institutionalization of children, were
stimulated to look for alternative methods of addressing the
problem. In an effort to eliminate the need for mothers' pensions, then, the private charitable organizations developed a
number of programs designed to keep children with their
families. Day nurseries for the children of working mothers,
and programs of private relief were established and grew;
job-placing programs were developed. The State Charities'
Aid Association was constantly looking for alternatives that
would prevent the separation of mothers and their children
(Schneider .

. .,

pp. 181-183). They organized a program to

place single mothers in positions in the country where their
children would be accepted.
Indeed, as a direct outgrowth of the Ahearn bill, the
Charity Organization Society created their "Committee on
Dependent Children", which was to examine all applications
made by parents for the institutional care of their children,
and, as an alternative to placement, to help all "worthy"
families remain together. Since all applications for institutionalization were processed through the Department of
Public Charities, each day a representative of the Committee
went to their offices to examine the records. Home investigations were made of the most likely candidates for their services, and those families deemed "worthy" were aided. In its
Seventeenth Annual Report, the Committee proudly stated
that no special funding was needed for this program, because the Society "called upon friends, relatives, employers,

neighbors or . . . when necessary, turned to strangerseither individual donors or relief societies" such as the St.
Vincent de Paul or the United Hebrew Charities (The Charity Organization Society of New York, 1899, p. 14).
Few families were found worthy, however. During the
first year, the Society examined the records of 888 families
representing the possible placement of 1,607 children. Their
standards must have been exceedingly stringent, however.
According to their report, most of the families were not considered worthy of Charity Organization Society assistance:
599 families were rejected, and 1,111 children, or 69% of the
total, were institutionalized.
THE ULTIMATE PASSAGE OF MOTHERS' PENSIONS LAWS

Twelve years after the first introduction of the "Destitute
Mothers' Bill", in 1909, the first White House Conference on
Children issued a pronouncement that "Home life is the
highest and finest product of civilization ... children
should not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling reasons . . .,"16 This pronouncement gave voice to what
had become, by 1909, a widespread sentiment in favor of
legislation to provide "widows' pensions", or financial assistance for mothers of children whose father were dead or
otherwise absent and unable to assume financial responsibility for them. Such legislation was at last initiated in 1911 in
Illinois and reached New York in 1915. These laws were the
precursors to the federal AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935.
A number of factors led to the eventual passage of these
reforms. According to Schneider, mothers' pensions finally
became a reality when social outrage demanded them. During the years from 1895 to 1915, the public's growing interest
in child welfare, in conjunction with other reforms of the
Progressive Era, led to an extension of responsibility for the
welfare of the dependent, delinquent and handicapped children (Schneider . ., p. 197). In addition, institutionalization
was costly. Epstein, who commented in 1933, stated that
"... public authorities outraged motherhood [not only] by
breaking up homes and paying for the support of dependent
children in institutions ... [but also because] the cost in

dollars and cents proved higher than if the mother had been
paid for raising her children" (Epstein, 1933, p. 624).
Support for mother's pensions had indeed grown. According to Mark Leff, a number of progressive newspapers
and magazines contributed to public demand for change.
The Delineator, a women's fashion magazine, began an
active anti-institution campaign in 1907 which eventually
grew into a crusade for mother's pensions. Other newspapers and magazines that contributed editorials and
endorsements were the New York Evening World, the
Scripps-McRae and Hearst chains, and Outlook, Nation, and
Public.
Soon after the establishment of juvenile courts, many
judges became aware that mothers' pensions were needed. It
became evident from the experience in such courts that (1)
many delinquents were the children of mothers who were
not around to train, influence and care for their children because they had to work, and (2) that many mothers and children were separated solely because of poverty (Cohen, 1924,
pp. 115-116).
By 1909, many advocates believed that children had a
right to be brought up in a family. At the White House Conference on Children in 1909, the Honorable Julian Mack,
Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court said:
"I cannot understand why poverty alone should give anybody the right to deprive the child of that which it needs most
in life-its own parents' love and care and sympathy . .. to
deprive the parent of that which he or she needs most in life,
the love and support of the child, the reciprocal relations be17
tween the parent and the child."
Some (but certainly not all) Charity Organization Society
and Children's social workers who had been against
mothers' pensions now supported them. What seemed like a
daring and unwise idea to the social workers and philanthropists of 1897 became public policy in most states by
1915, federal law by 1935, and has remained in force ever
since. Despite the fact that the number and type of mothers
covered was always limited, despite intermittent controversy
about the effects of public assistance on recipients, and de-

spite recent attempts to restrict that assistance; the complete
elimination of the AFDC program has never since been seriously proposed.
CONCLUSION

It should be noted that there are two principle explanations for the resistance to mothers' pensions. First, the
charitable organizations of the 1890's were committed to
their social philosophy. They believed they were right about
the nature of poverty, and of poor persons. A system of public mothers' pensions would be in direct contradiction to
what they believed was just, proper and effective. They
therefore acted on their beliefs in an effective, efficient and
well-organized way. They acknowledged the problem, and
offered what they saw as a solution, condemning Senator
Ahearn's solution because (1) they believed it would cause
more problems than it would solve, and (2) it would cause
them to lose some of their power to exercise control over the
behavior of poor persons.
The second explanation has to do with the nature of the
organizations involved and of their interests. The nature of a
bureaucracy is that it works not only to carry out its societal
function, but also to insure its own survival. According to
Merton's theory of "vested interests", it is to the advantage
of those in power to oppose any change that will "either
eliminate or at least make uncertain their differential advantage deriving from current arrangements" (Merton, 1968, p.
253).
It was their vested interests that accounted for the great
resistance put forth by the agencies. On the one hand, the
children's institutions stood to lose children and therefore a
portion of their funding. Earlier action by City and State had
already resulted in a reduction in the number of children in
care, and such children were needed if the institutions were
to survive. The organizations that dispensed private charity,
on the other hand, stood to lose their central function in the
social welfare field if public outdoor relief became the
method for aiding the poor. And, the implementation of a

program so contrary to their practices would have implied
extreme criticism.
The agencies that formed a coalition against the Ahearn
bill were organized in such a way that they could rapidly
mobilize support, and each agency had the ability to appear
at hearings and to testify. The State Charities Aid Association had full-time staff that could write letters, contact other
agencies, influence people, and plan strategies. Legislators
and public officials were used to hearing from and dealing
with officials of the charitable organizations, whose connections with powerful philanthropists were well-known.
Mayor Strong, a one-term "anti-corruption" Mayor in a city
long ruled by corrupt Tammany politicians, had been helped
into office by the very persons who also held membership
on agency boards.
On the other hand, in 1897, there was no organization
for mothers' pensions. At Mayor Strong's hearings in 1897
only two persons showed up to testify for the bill, a representative of Senator Ahearn, who didn't think that it was
necessary to attend, himself; and a woman who said she represented nobody, and therefore had no power, and no voters to influence. The testimony of the bill's proponents focused only on why the current system was harmful. Rather
than answer them, the proponents simply ignored the
charitable organizations' predictions of dire consequences if
the bill were passed. The testimony of the various representatives of the charitable organizations, on the other hand,
while acknowledging that the break-up of families was to be
avoided where possible, claimed that the solution was
wrong, would be harmful to the persons involved and would
be extremely costly to the public.
By virtue of their apparent expertise, their connections
with the powerful, their relationships with legislators and
public officials, and their logical follow-through, the
arguments of the charitable organizations' officials carried
more weight. It was not until later, when another faction of
social workers joined in alliance with politicians and others
to mount in an effort for mothers' pensions, that such legislation was successful.

NOTES
1.

The date of March 30, 1897 was reported in the Twenty-Fifth Annual
Report of the State Charities Aid Association (Page 80). According to
Homer Folks' article, "Proposed Legislation Concerning Children in
New York," appearing in The Charities Review (July-August 1897), the
legislation was introduced on March 13. The date of introduction of
the Ahearn Bill is not available in the records of the New York State
Legislature for 1897 because it was not signed into law.

2.

Senator Ahearn's bill provided mothers' pensions only for the poor of
New York City and not the State as a whole because such aid was
available in the rest of the state through a system of outdoor public
relief. Outdoor relief had been curtailed only in New York City.

3.

"Scored the Ahearn Bill", New York Times, (July 22, 1897) p. 12.

4.

"Parents' Compensation for Indigent Children; Senate Committee
Hearing on Ahearn Bill", New York Times, February 9, 1898, Page 3.

5.

According to librarians at the New York State Library, legislative records of the original hearings would not have been preserved since
the bill never became law.

6.

New York Times, June 5, 1895, page 8, column 3; June 6, 1895, page 2,
column 4.

7.

New York Times, March 4, 1894, page 13; January 1, 1896, page 9;
January 5, page 17; January 10, page 10; January 14, page 9; January
25, page 9; January 28, page 10; February 4, page 16; February 11,
page 10; February 23, page 17; February 25, page 16; February 28,
page 9; March 19, page 9; March 20, page 9; March 26, page 2; March
27, page 8; September 3, page 16; June 19, 1897, page 2; October 7,
page 4.

8.

New York Times, June 19, 1897, page 1; June 20, page 12.

9.

New York Times, April 1, 1897, page 1.

10.

New York Times, November 29, 1894, page 1.

11.

New York Times, August 6, 1896, page 3.

12.

New York Times, May 18, 1898, page 12; May 19, page 14.

13.

Estimates of the actual number of children placed vary. While
Thurston estimated that the number of children placed from 1853
through 1929 was 31,081, Langsam (Children West, 1964) reported

85,292 children placed. Her figures were taken directly from the annual reports of the Society.
14.

Laws of 1875,,Chapter 173.

15.

Opposing organizations included the Charity Organization Society;
the State Charities' Aid Association; the Society of St. Vincent de
Paul; and the New York State Board of Charities.

16.

"Letter to the President of the United States Embodying the Conclusions of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children," Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, 1909,
pp. 192-197; as found in Bremner, Children, 2:365-366.

17.

Proceedings of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, 1909,
pp. 41-53, reprinted in Bremner, Children, 2:363.
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